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CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and 
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ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah 
corporation, DON VAN STEETER, 
M. D., TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M. D., 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 20713 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS DON VAN STEETER, M. D. 
AND TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M. D. 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
This appeal concerns two sections of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act: § 78-14-4, which provides a two-year statute 
of limitations and a four-year statute of repose in medical 
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malpractice actions, and § 78-14-8, which requires at least 90 
days prior written notice of intent before any medical malpractice 
suit may be filed.1/ 
Section 78-14-8 also provides that the limitations or 
repose period will be extended by 120 days from the date of the 
service of the notice of intent if the notice is served less than 
90 days before the expiration of the "applicable" time period. 
The issue is whether a notice of intent served less than 
90 days before the expiration of the limitations period, but not 
less than 90 days before the expiration of the repose period, extends 
both periods, as plaintiffs contend, or extends only the limitations 
period, as the lower court held. 
1/ S 78-14-4 is both a statute of limitations and a statute of 
repose. The two-year period is a statute of limitations 
since it procedurally limits the time in which a suit may be 
brought but does not determine the substantive right to 
bring the suit in the first place. The four-year period is 
a statute of repose since it cuts off any right of action 
after the passage of a certain period of time, in essence a 
substantive determination of the right to bring the action. 
Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues: 
An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose 
in Products Liability, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 476 (1981);" 
cited in Maxine Wheaton v. Joseph E. Jack, M. P., Civ. No. 
C-82-0039W, slip op. (D. Utah, August 9, 1982) (Memorandum 
Decision upholding the constitutionality of § 78-14-4). 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
These are the relevant portions of the two statutes: 
78-14-4. Statute of Limitations-Exceptions-
Application, 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. 
78-14-8. Notice of Intent to Commence Action. 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be initiated unless and until 
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant 
or his executor or successor, at least ninety 
days1 prior notice of intent to commence an 
action. . . . If the notice is served less 
than ninety days prior to the expiration of the 
applicable time period, the time for commencing 
the malpractice action against the health 
care provider shall be extended to 120 days 
from the date of service of notice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These defendants find plaintiffs1 Statement of the Case 
to be substantially accurate and, in accordance with Rule 24(b), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, accept it for purposes of this 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute of limitations and the statute of repose 
are distinct time constraints, each serving a different purpose, 
each of which must be met. Satisfying the limitations period 
does not excuse satisfaction of the repose period. Nor does the 
extension of the limitations period necessarily extend the repose 
period. Section 78-14-8 grants a 120-day extension from the 
date of the service of a notice of intent only when that notice of 
intent is served less than 90 days before the "applicable" time 
period expires. While the limitations period in this case was 
"applicable," that is, in need of extension, and was so extended, 
the repose period was not "applicable," not needing extension, and 
hence, was not extended. This action is, therefore, barred by 
the statute of repose. 
ARGUMENT 
This action is barred by the statute of repose unless 
the repose period was extended by the notice of intent. That 
notice was served less than 90 days before the expiration of the 
limitations period, but not within 90 days of the expiration of 
the repose period. The only issue is whether the 120-day extension 
of the limitations period also extended the repose period. If it 
did, this action was timely commenced and the lower court should 
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be reversed. If it did not, this action is barred and the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
I. 
Several dates are relevant here. The alleged malpractice 
occurred on March 1, 1981. The "injury," as defined in Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979), was discovered by 
plaintiffs on November 27, 1982. The notice of intent was served 
on November 20, 1984, and this action was filed on March 12, 1985. 
The limitations period, absent any extension, would 
have expired on November 27, 1984 — two years after the date of 
discovery. The repose period, absent any extension, would have 
expired on March 1, 1985 — four years after the date of the 
alleged malpractice. 
The notice of intent was served 7 days before the 
expiration of the limitations period and 101 days before the 
expiration of the repose period. It created a 90-day "waiting 
period" from November 20, 1984 to February 18, 1985, during which 
an action could not be filed. The notice of intent also served 
to extend the limitations period by 120 days from the date of 
service, that is, until March 19, 1985. Between February 19, 
the end of the "waiting period," and March 1, 1985, there was a 
12-day grace period in which plaintiffs could have filed this 
- 7 -
action and met both the unextended repose period, which expired 
March 1, and the extended limitations period, which expired March 
19. 
II. 
The limitations period and the repose period represent 
a legislative compromise between the desire to provide a reasonable 
period of time for an injured person to commence a malpractice 
action and the desire to limit that time to a specific period for 
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably 
and accurately calculated. See, § 78-14-2; Allen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. , 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 1981); Hargett v. Limberg, 
598 F. Supp. 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984). The limitations period 
expresses the first legislative desire, the repose period the 
second. 
A plaintiff must, of course, meet both statutory time 
periods. One who discovers his injury five years after the date 
of the malpractice and then files an action is barred by the statute 
of repose, even though he is within the statute of limitations. 
Conversely, one who files an action three years after discovery 
of his injury, but within four years of the date of the malpractice, 
is barred by the statute of limitations, although within the 
statute of repose. Meeting one of the statutory time periods 
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does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation of meeting the 
other. 
These plaintiffs contend that extending both time periods 
is unnecessary. They argue that since they extended, and met, 
the limitations period, they necessarily extended, and met, the 
repose period. That argument is no more persuasive than the 
argument that meeting one statutory period meets the other. 
Section 78-14-8 provides that "if the notice is served 
less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action . . . 
shall be extended to 120 days from the date of the service of 
notice.11 The word "applicable" is key. 
Plaintiffs contend that the "applicable" time period is 
the first time period to expire. The lower court held that the 
"applicable" time period was the period which needed to be extended; 
that is, the time period which would otherwise expire during the 
90-day waiting period after service of the notice of intent. In 
this case, the limitations period was in need of extension because 
plaintiffs could not commence their action until the expiration 
of the waiting period on February 18, 1985. The limitations 
period which, unless extended, would have expired on November 27, 
1984, was extended by § 78-14-8 for 120 days, until March 19, 
- 9 -
1985. But that extension had no effect on the expiration of 
the repose period. 
The repose period never needed to be extended and, 
hence, was never the "applicable" period. Plaintiffs could 
have filed this action at any time between the expiration of the 
waiting period on February 18, 1985, and the expiration of the 
repose period on March 1, 1985, and would have met both the 
limitations and the repose period. 
Nothing obligated plaintiffs to use the full 120-day 
period given to them in connection with the extension of the 
limitations period. That 120-day period was merely permissive 
and did not prevent them from filing at any time after the 90-day 
waiting period expired without using the entire 120 days. 
Plaintiffs contend that the lower court's decision 
could lead to a dilemma from which there is no relief. However, 
plaintiffs themselves never faced this dilemma. In their 
hypothetical, a prospective plaintiff served a notice of intent 
90 days before the repose period expired and 89 days before the 
limitations period expired. In that situation, the prospective 
plaintiff could never timely commence an action, because the 
waiting period had not expired yet the repose period had. From 
this, plaintiffs conclude that the lower court's interpretation 
of § 78-14-8 is "nonsensical." [Appellant's Brief at 10]. 
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What is nonsensical is that any plaintiff would serve a 
notice of intent on the assumed date, since if that plaintiff 
waited but one day, or served it but one day earlier, the problem 
would not exist. For example, a notice served on October 5 would 
give an additional 120 days as to both the limitations and the 
repose periods, since it would have been filed within 90 days of 
the expiration date of each. Alternatively, a notice served on 
October 3 would give plaintiff a one-day window in which to file. 
Plaintiffs' hypothetical presumes a self-inflicted dilemma which 
common sense could have avoided, rather than an unavoidable 
situation created by the statutes. 
Plaintiffs had two years and 101 days to commence their 
action after discovering the alleged negligence. They could have 
filed at any time between February 19 and March 1, 1985, and met 
both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. They 
did not do so, not because of circumstances beyond their control, 
but because they chose not to do so. 
CONCLDSION 
In conclusion, defendants Van Steeter and Toyota 
respectfully submit that the decision of the lower court granting 
summary judgment in their favor should be affirmed. 
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